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Preferably scientific investigations would promote true rather than false beliefs.
The phenomenon of fraud represents a standing challenge to this veritistic ideal.
When scientists publish fraudulent results they knowingly enter falsehoods into the
information stream of science. Recognition of this challenge has prompted calls for
scientists to more consciously adopt the veritistic ideal in their own work. In this
paper I argue against such promotion of the veritistic ideal. It turns out that a
sincere desire on the part of scientists to see the truth propagated may well promote
more fraud rather than less.
1 Introduction
Preferably scientific investigations would promote true rather than false beliefs. The
phenomenon of fraud represents a standing challenge to this veritistic ideal. When
scientists publish fraudulent results they knowingly enter falsehoods into the information
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stream of science. Recognition of this challenge has prompted calls for scientists to more
consciously adopt the veritistic ideal in their own work. In this paper I argue against
such promotion of the veritistic ideal: a sincere desire on the part of scientists to see the
truth propagated may well promote more fraud rather than less.
To understand the background of such calls for scientists to be more consciously
veritistic, it is necessary to understand the role of the credit motive in incentivising
scientific work. A significant proportion of the activities of scientists can be explained
by appeal to the fact that they seek to maximise their credit (Cole and Cole 1967),
(Merton 1968), (Dasgupta and David 1994), (Latour and Woolgar 1986, ch.5). It is
well established by this point that in order to understand a group’s ability to produce
and disseminate knowledge we must understand facts about how that group is socially
organised (Zollman 2010), (Muldoon 2013), (Kummerfeld and Zollman Forthcoming).
As such, social epistemologists have studied the credit economy, and have largely found
that such selfish credit seeking behaviour by scientists inadvertently promotes socially
beneficial epistemic outcomes (Kitcher 1990), (Dasgupta and David 1994), (Strevens
2003), (Strevens 2006), (Bruner 2013), (Muldoon 2013, §2). This research programme
has thus been described as an ‘invisible hand’ tradition, since the basic idea is that while
decision making at the individual level may not be guided by the desire to ascertain the
truth, this tends to be conducive to truth finding success at the social level (Solomon
2001, 55).
However, running contrary to this happy social epistemic consensus, the phenomena
of fraud has been claimed by many sociologists to be a negative consequence of the oper-
ation of the credit economy (Merton 1973, 309-312), (Ben-Yehuda 1986, 5) (Zuckerman
1988) (Sovacol 2008, 275–277), (Casadevall and Fang 2012, 892). For instance, draw-
ing a moral from examining a case study of scientific fraud, Broad and Wade conclude:
“Many scientists, no doubt, still keep truth as their goal. For many, however, a more
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immediate objective often intrudes into vision, that of establishing credit” (Broad and
Wade 1983, 52–53). It is this more immediate objective that they believe leads to fraud-
ulent publication. Likewise Fanelli et al. (2015) claim the motivation for committing
fraud is “to gain an unfair advantage in the race for priority and success”. Given that
fraud involves the deliberate introduction of error into the epistemic community, this
theory would require the invisible hand tradition to modify its epistemic estimation of
the credit economy.
This theory about the cause of fraud has lent itself to policy proposals to modify or
eliminate the credit economy, replacing it with more conscious adoption of the veritistic
ideal. I refer to works that advocate such policies as the ‘motive modification’ tradition
of anti-fraud research. The following quote succinctly summaries the ambitions of the
motive modification tradition: “[t]he persistence of false findings can be meliorated with
strategies that make the fundamental but abstract accuracy motive – getting it right –
competitive with the more tangible and concrete incentive – getting it published” (Nosek
et al. 2012, 615). Some have even gone further, with Du Bois (1898) arguing that the only
acceptable motivation for scientists is the pure pursuit of the truth, which would have
to be unsullied by concern for credit. However one brings about motive modification,
optimistically, one might even hope that a suitably designed incentive structure could
retain the benefits of the credit economy mentioned above while also using the tempering
effects of a truth motive to simultaneously reduce the incident of fraud.
The overarching lesson of this paper, however, is that motive modification is not
enough. This is because the theory that it is based upon is in need of update or revision.
The identification of the credit motive as the source of scientific fraud represented an
overly simplistic understanding of the causes of fraud. In §2 (and in formal detail in
the appendix) I describe a model of academic publication which allows me to investigate
counterfactually what behaviors to expect given different motivations among scientists.
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In §3 I report some results (proven in the appendix) that undermine the motive modifi-
cation tradition of anti-fraud research. Simply making “truth” compete on equal footing
with “credit” only changes the situations in which scientists are incentivised to commit
fraud, but does nothing to suggest that scientists will be incentivised to commit fraud
less often. Further, by considering the results of scholars assuming there is some cost
to committing fraud, I show that pure credit seekers will in some circumstances be in-
centivised to report just those results they obtained while those who are concerned with
the truth are incentivised to do otherwise. In §4, §5 and §6 I discuss these results in
relation to both the motive modification tradition of anti fraud and also work elsewhere
in social epistemology of science. I argue that what explains the failure of the motive-
modification tradition in anti-fraud research is that the desire to promote true beliefs
among one’s fellows can incentivise a scholar to lie when the scholar distrusts the results
of the experimental work they themselves have carried out.
2 Publication Market Models
To investigate the efficacy of motive modification anti-fraud policy, I investigate the
behaviour of agents within a class of models I call publication market models. These
represent an arbitrarily large field of scholars trying to discern the truth of the matter
regarding some central question of interest. The formal details of publication market
models, along with relevant proofs, can be found in the appendix. I give informal
description of publication market models here.
Within any publication market model, there is a set of scholars, and a question repre-
sented by a set of possible answers. Each scholar does some investigation on the question,
and comes to favour one of the answers. Following (Hintikka 2007, ch.2), inquiry is mod-
eled as scholars asking a question of nature and receiving some answer. In the model
I represent Nature as answering questions by sending each scholar an independent and
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identically distributed signal of one of the answers from within the question set. The
signal received by a scholar raises their credence in whatever answer it suggested. There
is one answer that is epistemically favoured – the “true” answer – regarding the ques-
tion. In the model truth is represented by Nature selecting an answer in advance of
distributing signals.
To represent publication, after Nature has distributed signals among the scholars, each
scholar publicly announces some answer to the question, that need not be the one Nature
signaled to them. Note that the signals are private to each scientist, what is public and
presumed to be shared among the scientists are answers to the question. The model
hence does not suppose that each scientist has applied the same method to the same
question, and that should all come to the same answer we may have indefinitely many
scientists publishing essentially identical papers. Rather, this is intended to model of the
following sort of situation. There is some question of common interest to many in a field,
e.g. what caused the extinction of the dinosaurs? Can a material with certain properties
be cheaply synthesised? Does raising the minimum wage increase unemployment? The
scientists in the field share a sense of what the possible answers to this question are, and
are able to identify when two different investigations have come to the same answer on
this question. For instance, they are able to recognise data sets drawn from different
times and regions which both show no rise in unemployment following some law raising
the minimum wage as both supporting a ‘No’ answer to the question: does raising
the minimum wage increase unemployment? I assume it is answers to such questions,
rather than raw presentations of data, which are the objects of scientific interest, and
the potential sources of scientific credit.
That question about unemployment represents an easy case because it leads to a simple
‘Yes/No’ dichotomy in its possible answers. Often it will not be so easy to state precisely
what answers may be expected to a question in advance of investigation. This model
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of scientific investigation hence represents an idealisation aspects of scientific practice
highlighted by Kuhn (1996, ch.4). Kuhn argues that, when engaged in normal science,
scientists who share a paradigm will agree on ‘the nature of acceptable solutions’ to
the puzzles they try to solve (Kuhn 1996, 38). I idealise this picture by modelling such
agreement to go so far as to yield identical sets of possible answers to the question being
investigated. This idealisation does not play too great a role in what follows, however,
as the results I establish and rely upon concern the reasoning of an individual scientist
trying to anticipate the results of their fellows investigations. Nothing would be lost if
it turns out such a scientist did not accurately portray the range of possible answers or
did so differently from a peer, as their personal estimation of the range of possibilities
is what matters for their own publication decisions.
Once agents have published there is an election among the answers that have been
announced, with the winner of the election representing the answer(s) to the question
that the community has come to settle upon. The election over announced propositions
represents uptake within target communities that a scholar may care about when de-
ciding what to publish. Note that I make minimal assumptions about how the winner
of the election is decided. I assume only that being more popular cannot count against
an answer; that if a given answer would have been consensus had one less person opted
for it, then all else being equal it will still be victorious if it receives that extra vote.
To illustrate the sort of uptake I have in mind, I mention here uptake within two sort
of target communities the scholar may be concerned with. First, the election over an-
nounced propositions may represent a sort of bounded rationality within an academic
scholarly community. Academics may not be able to keep track of the precise degree to
which various answers are supported within a scholarly literature, but they can at least
review the literature and decide what response to the question is best supported by their
results of the community’s collective endeavour. Second, the election over announced
propostions may represent uptake among a non-academic audience (e.g. policy makers,
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or representatives of industry) who are not competent to review a literature in depth
but are able to gain a general sense for what propositions are best supported therein.
Each scholar has a utility type; differences between utility types allow for the inves-
tigation of the effects upon fraudulent publication of different incentive structures. I
explore three utility types in this paper. The first is a pure credit seeker, who cares only
that the community comes to believe whatever answer to the question the credit seeker
themselves has announced, since the credit seeker’s scholarly reputation is associated
with the fate of this position. In the actual credit economy of academia in order for
a scholar to gain significant credit from a publication a scholar does not just need the
community to settle upon their favoured proposition but also need to be seen to be first
to arrive at that proposition (Strevens 2003). However, note that in that scenario it is
still a necessary condition for any credit seeker to gain their reward that the community
adopts their preferred belief. Further, it is not always clear who will be awarded priority
for a given claim, so a credit seeker may justifiably give positive subjective probability to
the event that it will be them, as long as they defend the proposition that the community
ends up agreeing on. The second utility type is that of the pure truth seeker who cares
only that the community consensus - the victor of the election - is whatever proposi-
tion Nature favoured, without concern as to whether they are on the right side of that
consensus. Finally, there is the mixed credit/truth seeker, who is concerned both that
the community come to believe the proposition Nature has favoured when dispensing
evidence, but also that they be seen to be on the correct side of this consensus in their
contribution to the literature.
Before moving on, it is worth noting the manner in which I characterised the utility
types in this model. All utility types have a binary preference structure. Their rewards
are either all or nothing; either the community comes to accept just what they would
prefer and they win, or they get no payout at all. One might consider an alternate
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way of representing truth tempering the operation of the credit economy by means of
scholars with more nuanced preference structure. In particular, to capture the idea of
tempering the credit economy by considering scholars who do want to win credit, but
who if they are not to get credit would at least prefer the community to settle upon the
truth. However, in lemma 2 of the appendix I show that this alternate representation
of nuancing the operation of the credit economy would not work, since such a scholar
would behave exactly like a pure credit seeker.
Scholars also have a credence function. This is a probability distribution over what I
dub each scholar’s relativised state space. This is a construction each scholar generates
for themselves representing the possible states of the literature they think they could
face at point of publication. Formal details are given in the appendix. For present
purposes it suffices to note that the relativised state space for a given scholar represents
all the ways they think their peers could publish, under the supposition that each of the
possible answers in fact obtains. An example of such a relativised state space is given
below.
Scholars maximise expected utility given their credences over the relativised state
space and given their utility type. I say a scholar is incentivised to fraud just in case it
would not be an expected utility maximising response to the literature to offer up the
answer that Nature signaled to them. The quoted remarks in §1 from Nosek et al. suggest
that their analysis of the situation regarding fraudulent publication is that presently
all too many scholars are incentivised, consciously or unconsciously, to commit fraud
because they are pure credit seekers, and that anti-fraud reform can be achieved by
converting these agents into mixed credit/truth seekers.
A more far reaching reform, defended by W.E.B. Du Bois, would be insisting that
scholars ought to be motivated by only the desire to attain and disseminate the truth.
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In particular, Du Bois claimed that “[s]tudents must be careful to insist that science
as such... has but one simple aim: the discovery of truth” (Du Bois 1898, 16) This
was to be a public rather than private acquisition of truth, a communalist rather than
individualist pure truth seeking, since Du Bois also insisted that science’s “results lie
open to the use of all men” before reiterating that “the aim of science as such is simple
truth” (Du Bois 1898, 16). Hence scientific investigation should be, according to (as I
shall call it) DuBoisian alethic puritanism, motivated only by a desire that truth should
be believed by as many as possible.
The results I obtain will show that without special assumptions being made about
how scholars form their credences over the relativised state space there is no reason to
believe that motive modification would disincentivise fraud. To illustrate some of what
is driving results in this model, I discuss two behavioural assumptions one could make
about scholars, focussing on how the behavioural assumptions affect the prospects of
motive modification anti fraud research.
The first assumption I call ‘Cost of Fraud’, since it represents scholars acting as if there
is some small risk associated with committing fraud. Under this assumption scholars
take there to be some small 1 > 0 cost to publishing fraudulent results. This may
obtain, for instance, if scholars think that there is a very low chance that they will get
caught for committing fraud, but expect to be punished if they do. I consider the effects
of this behavioral posit in that class of cases where scholars think that, first, how they
announce will be decisive in what the community comes to believe, and, second, that
the community could be made to settle upon the answer the scholar takes Nature to
have favoured. The justification for singling out this class of cases is given in the next
section. In the appendix I show that within this class of cases Cost of Fraud more often
makes credit seekers incentivised to honesty than it does for truth seeking scholars.
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The second assumption I call ‘Self Confidence’: a scholar is self confident if they assign
some small 2 ≥ 0 credence to any element of their relativised state space where Nature
did not favour whatever signal Nature sent them. This models a scholar who is very
sure of their own experimental work; they believe whatever their experiments reveal,
regardless of what they take other scientists to have learned. I show there that if this
is how scholars assign their credences then motive modification may serve to reduce
fraud. Future work in publication market models could profitably focus on exploring
the behaviour of scholars under different classes of assumptions about how they assign
credences in light of the signal Nature sends them.
To illustrate the model at work, consider the following arrangement of the model. The
set of scholars has three members {1, 2, 3}. They are investigating some proposition,
which has two potential answers {aK ; aJ}. I construct below scholar 3’s relativised
state space, and tabulate the payouts 3 would receive for given announcements (with
possible announcements listed on the far left hand side) were they a pure credit seeker,
mixed credit/truth seeker, or pure truth seeker respectively. The top row of this table
represents Nature’s favoured answer. The second row of the table represents various
combinations of publications scholar 3’s peers may offer to the literature. Note that
each announcement is superscripted with the scholar who made it and subscripted by
the answer it supports. Assume the election is majoritarian. The other rows represent
the payouts scholar 3 would receive under various suppositions about their utility type
and which answer they submit to the literature.
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Nature’s Choice: aK aK aK aK aJ aJ aJ aJ
The Literature: a1K ; a2K a1K ; a2J a1J ; a2K a1J ; a2J a1K ; a2K a1K ; a2J a1J ; a2K a1J ; a2J
Pure Credit: a3K 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
Pure Credit: a3J 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Credit & Truth: a3K 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Credit & Truth: a3J 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Pure Truth: a3K 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Pure Truth: a3J 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Figure 1
To illustrate – the second from left column represents the scenario where Nature
favours aK , and both scholar 1 and 2 publish defences of aK . Whereas the fifth from
left column represents the case where Nature favours aJ , while scholars 1 and 2 none
the less both publish in defence of aK . Whether scholar 3 would be incentivised to fraud
in such a scenario would depend on how their credence function distributed probability
among these possibilities, what Nature had signaled to them, and their utility type. So
suppose, for instance, that they believed it overwhelmingly likely (for concreteness sake:
they assign credence 1) that they are in the rightmost cell of the table. In that case if
Nature signaled to scholar 3 aK then they could be incentivised to fraud if they were a
pure or mixed credit/truth seeker, but not if they were a pure truth seeker.
3 Motive Modification Results
I report four theorems relevant to assessing the motive modification tradition of anti-
fraud research. Formal proofs are given in the appendix. The first result I dub the
pessimistic theorem, since it undermines the meliorist reform programme advocated
by Nosek et al. (2012), and perhaps also Broad and Wade (1983). According to the
pessimistic theorem, the class of elements of a scholar’s relativised state space which, if
given any positive credence, will constitute some temptation to commit fraud, has the
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following features. The only circumstances under which converting a pure credit seeker
into a mixed credit/truth seeker could reduce the scholar’s incentive to fraud are within
those elements of the relativised state space when the scholar does not think they can
actually sway what answer the scientific community comes to accept. What is worse,
converting a scholar into a mixed credit/truth seeker from a credit seeker can actually
introduce incentives to lie where previously there were none. Driving that latter result
are occasions where a scholar does not think their own results to be representative of the
truth but does think themselves to be influential. If, for whatever reason, a scholar thinks
their results are flawed, but also believes themselves capable of publishing answers to
the question that will sway their fellows towards the truth, then the mixed credit/truth
seeker is tempted to tell a sort of noble lie. Whereas the pure credit seeker will just as
happily take the credit for the result they actually obtained, flawed or not. Note that in
these scenarios it is not quite that the pure credit seeker is incentivised not to lie; they
may just as happily, for all that has been said, report honest as dishonest results. Some
consideration of when the scholar might be actively incentivised to tell the truth comes
below. At the least, however, the proof of the pessimistic theorem shows that sometimes
the pure credit seeker has no incentive to lie where the mixed credit/truth seeker does.
More generally, it shows that converting scholars from credit seekers to truth seekers
could increase rather than decrease their incentive to fraud, or have no effect; absent
further information, motive modification cannot by itself be considered an anti-fraud
policy.
The second theorem I dub Du Bois’ Conjecture, because it is a partial vindication of
his alethic puritanism. According to Du Bois’ Conjecture, changing scholars’ motiva-
tions so that they are pure truth seekers rather than mixed credit/truth seekers strictly
decreases the class of scenarios in which a scholar is incentivised to lie. If two scholars are
otherwise identical except one is a pure truth seeker and the other a mixed credit/truth
seeker – then the set of elements of relativised state space wherein the latter would best
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respond by publishing a fraudulent answer is a proper superset of the set of elements of
relativised state space wherein the former would best respond by publishing a fraudu-
lent answer. This is a partial vindication of Du Bois’ point because since it supports his
claim that giving science a ‘double aim’ is worse than keeping one’s motivations purely
truth focussed (Du Bois 1898, 16). However, it is only a partial vindication because,
first, this theorem says nothing about the difficulties involved in implementing Du Bois’
suggestion, and, second, (as can be seen in Figure 1) there are still situations under
which a pure truth seeker might be incentivised to commit fraud.
The third theorem I report I dub Active Honesty, since it is a consideration of cases
where scholars will take honest reporting to be their unique expected utility maximising
option. One apparent result of the Pessimistic theorem was that in situations where a
scholar does think they can sway the scientific community motive modification research
can make no difference. I note that under the Cost of Fraud assumption this is not strictly
speaking true. Suppose scholars obey Cost of Fraud and consider those elements of the
state space where, first, scholars believe that how they vote will make a difference to what
the scholarly community comes to accept, second, the scholar’s preferred option is among
the beliefs the scholar supposes the community could come to accept, and, third, the
scholar believes they could induce the community to endorse Nature’s favoured option.
Theorem three shows that in such cases pure credit seekers’ best response will always be
to report honestly, whereas the mixed or pure truth seeking scholar can be incentivised
to commit fraud. This is because the pure credit seeker only wants to be on the winning
side, and if there is a cost to fraud then they should prefer to win without paying that
cost, so will bring it about that the announcement their data honestly favours is the
winning option. A truth seeking scholar, on the other hand, has nothing to gain from
having the community accept their favoured option if they do not think the answer their
own results favour is the option Nature favoured. As such they would be willing to lie
under that scenario where the credit seeker would not.
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The fourth theorem I report I dub the No Insecurity theorem, since it represents the
results of simultaneously inducing motive modification and making scientists extraor-
dinarily confident in their own results. Under the previously mentioned assumption
of Self Confidence, if Nature sends a scholar a signal favouring a given answer to the
question, they assign small 2 ≥ 0 credence to Nature favouring any answer other than
that suggested by their own signal. The scholar is maximally confident in the relia-
bility of their own signal. No Insecurity shows that while the pure credit seeker could
still be incentivised to commit fraud under such a scenario, the pure or mixed truth
seeking scholar could not be incentivised to commit fraud should they also satisfy Self
Confidence. Discussion of why this theorem holds will follow in §5.
4 Against Truth
The results of the publication market model suggest a need to rethink the motive mod-
ification tradition of anti-fraud research. First, both the pure truth seeker and the
mixed/credit truth seeker can be incentivised to lie even in scenarios where the pure
credit seeker would not be. That is to say, the truth motive can actually introduce new
reasons to commit fraud where there was none under the credit incentive. Consider, for
instance, the third column from the left in Figure 1, on the supposition that the agent
received signal a2 from Nature. Both the pure truth seeker and the mixed credit/truth
seeker would do best to announce dishonestly in that scenario, whereas the pure credit
seeker could happily announce the signal they actually received. Even more dramati-
cally, suppose that Cost of Fraud holds. Then, in an instance of the general point made
by Active Honesty, in this column the pure credit seeker’s unique best reply is to be
honest, whereas truth seeking scholars would have a unique best reply in announcing
dishonestly.
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Second, where the desire for the community to reach the truth reduces the incentive to
lie, it does so only in scenarios where scholars do not think themselves able to influence
the beliefs of their peers. To invest in motive modification anti-fraud policy is, therefore,
to bet against the vanity of scholars: it is to invest resources in a policy that could only
have its desired effects on the assumption that credit seeking scholars often do not think
themselves able to sway their colleagues. If one supposes that scholars’ are tolerably
good at estimating how likely it is that their publications will sway the community for
or against some position, this latter fact introduces a further problem for the motive
modification tradition of anti-fraud research. It would then be the case that the only
time it is likely that the difference between credit seeking and truth seeking makes a
difference are those scenarios where a scholars’ fraud is likely to do least damage to the
enterprise of science considered on a social level.
Considering Active Honesty exacerbates this worry about the relationship between
truth seeking and decisiveness. While motive modification anti-fraud policy may only
make a positive difference when scholars do not believe themselves to be decisive, it can
be actively harmful in scenarios where scholars do take themselves to be decisive. Motive
modification anti-fraud policy would seem to be targeted at the most harmless sorts of
fraud, and may reduce the incentive to be honest at just those points where dishonesty
could be most harmful.
Combining the Pessimistic and Active Honesty theorems we thus see: truth seeking
is liable to make the most epistemically powerful, those most able to sway the opinion
of others, more likely to commit fraud. The scientific community is in actuality highly
stratified (Cole and Cole 1973), meaning that there really are some people with an
especially large influence over the opinions of others in the community. It is these high
status individuals, whose errors are most likely to propagate throughout the community,
that the model suggests would be more likely induced to commit fraud by the truth
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motive. Assuming that high status individuals recognise their own social position, the
model suggests that widespread motive modification is very risky in our stratified social
environment.
That said, if one must carry out motive modification anti-fraud research, Du Bois’
Conjecture gives some reason to suppose that making scientists into pure truth seekers
is a better idea than making them into mixed credit/truth seekers. Take, for instance, the
case represented by Figure 1, there one finds that mixed credit/truth seeker can actually
be incentivised to dishonesty in more elements of their relativised state space than an
equivalent pure credit seeker would be. Whereas this does not hold for the pure truth
seeker. Du Bois’ Conjecture tells us that, more generally, the class of scenarios which
might induce a pure truth seeker to lie is a proper subset of the class of scenarios that
might induce a mixed credit/truth seeker to lie. However, even pure truth seeking is not
enough to, by itself, guarantee a reduction in the class of scenarios wherein scholars are
incentivised to commit fraud. Once again, Figure 1 illustrates a case wherein the pure
truth seeker is incentivised to commit fraud in just as many elements of their relativised
state space as the pure credit seeker.
The lesson I hope to come out of the Pessimistic theorem, Active Honesty, and Du
Bois’ Conjecture is that motive modification by itself is not enough. Without information
about which sort of scenarios scholars consider likely one cannot know whether changing
their utility functions will reduce fraud. For all we presently know it is possible that
motive modification could render fraud more tempting rather than less.
5 Noble Lies
Analysis of the model suggests a reason for the failure of the motive modification pro-
gramme. The motive modification anti-fraud tradition has failed to pay sufficient atten-
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tion to the possibility of ‘noble lies’. These are cases of the desire to have the community
come to believe true propositions forming its own incentive to lie, because one feels that
one’s own evidence would lead the community astray. The Active Honesty theorem il-
lustrates what a difference such a desire can make. In situations where the pure credit
seeker has no reason to pay the cost associated with committing fraud, the truth seeking
scholar has a countervailing incentive. The desire to see the truth propagated can make
scholars willing to pay the cost associated with fraud, taking on a risk to their personal
career for the sake of what they believe to be the communal good.
The No Insecurity theorem supports this analysis, and in doing so shows that there
may be hope for the motive modification tradition of anti fraud research if it is also
possible to eliminate the conditions which give rise to noble lies. To see this, consider
why the No Insecurity theorem holds. Suppose that in the scenario depicted by Figure
1, Nature sent signal aK to scholar 3. Suppose they were self confident in the way
described, and remove from Figure 1 all elements of the state space Self Confidence tells
us scholar 3 assigns very low credence to. Their relativised state space would then look
as such:
Nature’s Choice: aK aK aK aK
The Literature: a1K ; a2K a1K ; a2J a1J ; a2K a1J ; a2J
Pure Credit: a3K 1 1 1 0
Pure Credit: a3J 0 1 1 1
Credit & Truth: a3K 1 1 1 0
Credit & Truth: a3J 0 0 0 0
Pure Truth: a3K 1 1 1 0
Pure Truth: a3J 1 0 0 0
Figure 2
Note that whether scholar 3 is a pure or mixed truth seeking scholar, announcement aK –
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their honest announcement – weakly dominates aJ in Figure 2. This is because the only
scenarios where a truth-seeking scholar is not indifferent between their announcements
are ones wherein the signal Nature sent them is preferred. What this shows is that self
confidence renders the scholar very confident that the only way for the community to
get at the truth is for it to come to agree with the results of their own experiments. As
such, there are no noble lies for such scholars.
It is difficult to gather from observation of scientists present behaviour how often no-
ble lies are uttered. We currently operate within a credit economy where personal and
professional rewards come with publishing one’s results. As such it is difficult to disen-
tangle the desire for personal reward from the desire to promote one’s favoured beliefs,
even in cases where it is clear the fraudulent scholar in question believes wholeheartedly
the claims they fraudulently support.
There is, however, historical evidence that truth seeking scholars have been incen-
tivised to produce what we would now think of as noble lies. In particular, this is
illustrated by the behaviour of those who adhered to the ‘truth-to-nature’ epistemic
ideal as described in (Daston and Galison 2010, ch.2). Daston and Gallison describe the
behaviour of scientific atlas compilers, engaged in the project of trying to create images
of objects of interest for the use of naturalists working in fields like botany or crystal-
lography. Images of the objects of interest would be produced based upon observed
samples; however, atlas creators would not reproduce precisely what was observed, for
the concern was that ‘nature is full of diversity, but science cannot be’ (Daston and
Galison 2010, 73). Scientists would avoid reproducing exactly the observed sample in
their image, since they feared prompting readers to mistake what was peculiar to this
sample for a typical property of the object. As such, they would artistically render the
object in its ‘typical, ideal, characteristic’ or ‘average’ form (Daston and Galison 2010,
69).
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Atlas creators acting in line with the ideal of truth-to-nature thus deliberately pre-
sented their data in a manner that they did not believe Nature to have provided that
data, in order to ensure their readership formed true beliefs. In the seventeenth and
eighteenth century scientists could be upfront about this behaviour, since it was seen as
good practice by the wider scientific community. Nowadays a truth seeking scientist may
not be so forthright about correcting their data in this way, since it would be liable to
be taken for misconduct. However, while we may not valorise such behaviour any more,
the epistemological worry these authors were responding to remains. It is still possible
to believe that some peculiarity of one’s data or evidence would, if honestly reported,
mislead one’s community as to the truth of the matter. Truth seeking scholars may thus
still be tempted to utter noble lies.
Hence both analysis of my model and consideration of the past behaviour of scientists
shows that truth seeking scholars can be incentivised to utter noble lies, and thereby
cause problems for motive modification anti-fraud policy. Further work in the motive
modification tradition of anti-fraud research must show, if the tradition is to be viable,
that something about present conditions ensures that truth-seeking scientists would not
be tempted to utter noble lies.
6 Against Individualism
The model itself suggests one candidate method of ensuring truth seekers are not tempted
to commit noble lies; make them Self Confident. I therefore examine the relationship
between my results and previous work in the field to get some sense of whether Self
Confidence represents a desirable ideal for scientists. In particular, I compare my work
to previous work by Kitcher. In apparent contrast with Du Bois’ contentions, Kitcher
argued that alethic puritans would make the scientific community as a whole less reli-
able when it comes to ascertaining the truth. The source of the apparent disagreement
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between Kitcher’s results and Du Bois’ contentions depends upon a distinction between
communalist and individualust pure truth seekers. Kitcherian alethic puritan scholars
are concerned only that they personally acquire true beliefs (Kitcher 1990, 14). Kitcher
explicitly contrasts his model of pure truth seeking scientists with a model of scien-
tists that are more altruistic in their desire for the community of scholars at large to
arrive at true beliefs (Kitcher 1993, 344). Hence Kitcherian pure truth seeking, unlike
DuBoisian pure truth seeking, would be naturally modeled by individualist, rather than
communalist, truth seeking.
Kitcherian alethic puritans do not directly advance their goals by publishing. All they
care for is the results of their own investigations; they benefit from reading other people’s
work, but do not gain from the community being aware of theirs. Correspondingly, in
Kitcher’s 1990 model his alethic puritans engage in no publication or direct information
exchange.
However, if we assume that the esteem of the community is needed to retain access to
the resources of the scientific community then a Kitcherian alethic puritan will behave
in their publications as if they were a mixed credit/truth seeker. The only thing they
stand to gain out of publication is having the scholarly community give them esteem;
in effect, adding a concern for the communal consensus to their utility profile, making
them into a mixed credit/truth seeking agent. But by the pessimistic theorem that
need not make them an honest scholar, and by Du Bois’ Conjecture that is likely to
make them more dishonest than they would be if they were communally minded. Hence
persuading scientists to be Kitcherian alethic puritans should not be any more likely to
reduce the incentive to fraud than directly persuading them to be mixed credit/truth
seekers, and would be worse than persuading them to be DuBoisian alethic puritans.
Therefore my model can be seen to provide additional support to Kitcher’s attack on
epistemic individualism.
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Relating this back to Self Confidence, a tension arises. The self confident agent is, in
a certain sense, highly epistemically individualistic. In particular, they assign small 
credence to Nature favouring a signal other than that which they received even when they
believe that literally everyone else in their field is due to report a result other than that
which they obtained. This suggests strongly favouring the results of one’s own work as
compared to the results of communal endeavour. It is difficult to see how we might instill
in scientists this kind of confidence in the importance and accuracy of their own work
without also instilling in them a belief that their purpose as scientists is to discover the
truth in or by their own work. If this difficulty is acknowledged, and in so far as a general
moral of anti-individualism is the upshot of what is shared between Kitcher’s work and
my own, this mitigates against Self Confidence as an ideal for scientists’ allocation of
credences. This is, in turn, another blow to the motive modification tradition of anti-
fraud research, given the previous results. Further work would be needed to see if motive
modification could be effective under different suppositions about scientists’ allocation of
credences, or if despite appearances self confidence could be achieved without inducing
the harmful effects of epistemic individualism.
On the subject of future work needed, it is worth drawing a more general moral for the
social epistemology of science. In order to assess motive modification policy it has been
necessary to consider how efforts that might be successful in curtailing fraud – in this
case inducing Self Confidence combined with motive modification – would interact with
broader social and epistemic goals one may have for the scientific enterprise. It cannot
be assumed that the policy that would be most effective for minimising fraud is therefore
worth endorsing; perhaps there would be trade offs which render such minimisation not
worth the cost. My argument depends on the broad anti-individualism moral being
taken as a reliable guide to the overall good of science; it is not worth compromising on
this, I claim, in order to reduce the degree of fraud in science. But note that there are
non-trivial assumptions involved even in assuming that fraud, especially when it takes
21
the form of noble lies, is undesirable. Suppose truth-seeking scientists were very reliable
in their judgements about what sort of signals from nature are and are not misleading,
as was supposed during the era when the ideal of Truth-To-Nature discussed by Daston
and Gallison was endorsed by scientific atlas makers. Perhaps in that situation noble
lies, as they are picked out in the model, would be a net social epistemic good! I take
the general moral to be that to test my claim that individualism is an undesirable trait
to instill in scientists, and make similar arguments more precise, we need a workable
model of the common good of science, suitable for use by social epistemologists. It is far
beyond the scope of this paper to develop such a model, but I end this section by urging
that such a model be developed.
7 Conclusion
There is a shared moral of this and Kitcher’s work for social epistemology. As a slogan:
scientists who are epistemically individualist hinder science considered as a communal
enterprise. The role of noble lies highlights the degree to which epistemic individualism
can be harmful. As can be seen from considering Active Honesty and No Insecurity
together, even the communalist DuBoisian alethic puritan takes on board too much
individualism if they are willing to let a desire to promote their own sense of what is
true come before their communal duty of honest reporting. If No Insecurity were the
best hope for motive modification anti-fraud research, it would risk running afoul of this
anti epistemic indvidualism message. If the motive modification tradition is to survive,
therefore, further work is needed.
In particular, such further work should focus on ways of reducing or eliminating the
temptation to utter noble lies without inducing Self Confidence. One line of investigation
that the model renders salient would be finding some way of reducing the extent to which
science is socially stratified. After all, it is perceived decisiveness that the model suggests
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induces truth seekers to utter noble lies. Future work could hence explore the possibility
and likely consequences of egalitarian social reorganisation in science.
Future work should also produce further generalisations of this model. As mentioned
in §2, the model is designed to capture a specific sort of question scenario. It would
therefore be worth generalising the sort of questions scholars can ask of Nature and the
evidence they can receive from it. Further, it is implicitly assumed that one can publish
no matter what result one reports. Whereas one source of temptation to fraud might be
the idea that certain results (say, those reporting stronger effects) are more interesting to
the community and therefore more likely to get published. It is an interesting question
whether qualitatively similar results to those reported here would be found in a model
of inquiry which explored that source of temptation to fraud. Likewise, the electoral
structure of the model here prompts the thought that developing results concerning
strategic voting may shed light on the phenomenon of fraud in science. There is hence
potential for future formal work to expand on the modelling work begun in this paper.
A Proofs
A publication market model consists of a question, consisting of a set of possible answers
{a1...an}, some scholars {v1...vm}, and Nature. Nature first selects an element of the
question set, and then sends a signal to each element of the scholar set. Each signal
is paired with one (and only one) answer, such that if scholar vj receives signal si this
raises the vj credence in answer ai without effecting vj ’s judgements of relative credence
between aj and ak (where aj 6= ai and ak 6= ai). Call the element of the question set
selected by Nature the truth, and the signal scholar vj receives the evidence proposition
received by scholar vj . I call a specification of the question, the scholar set, and the
decisions made by Nature a configuration of the model.
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Each scholar chooses an answer to offer to their community. The election scholars
take part in can be represented by a function from the profile of answers scholars offer
to a winning answer. For ease of representation’s sake I assume there is a unique win-
ner, nothing will turn upon this assumption. Each scholar taking part in the election
knows how the election function operates. Finally, the election function satisfies: if a1 is
victorious from profile PA and PB differs from PA only in the fact that all votes besides
a1 have equal or less votes in PB as in PA and a1 has more votes in PB than in PA, then
a1 is victorious in PB.
Each scholar has a utility type, as per §2. I deal with three types in this paper. First,
there is the pure credit seeker, who gains payout of 1 if the evidence proposition they
announce is the winner of the election, and payout of zero otherwise. Second, there is the
pure truth seeker, who gains payout of 1 if the winner of the election is the proposition
Nature selected, and payout of 0 otherwise. Third, there is themixed credit/truth seeker,
who gains payout of 1 if they announce the proposition that wins the election and the
winner of the election is the answer Nature selected, and 0 otherwise.
Each scholar has a credence function. This is a probability distribution over all ele-
ments of a relativised state space, defined as follows. A relativised state space for scholar
vj is a set of pairs < p, a > where p is the voting profile of every scholar except for vj ,
and a is the answer chosen by Nature. So, for instance, if there are two scholars vX and
vY and two answers a1 and a2 the relativised state space for vX would be: < aY1 >1,
< aY1 >2, < aY2 >1, < aY2 >2. This would represent, respectively, the case where vY
announces a1 and Nature has favoured 1, where where vY announces a1 and Nature has
favoured 2, where vY announces a2 and Nature has favoured 1, and where where vY
announces a2 and Nature has favoured 2.
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Define a response procedure set as follows. Each element of vi’s relativised state space
is an announcement profile specifying, first, which answer Nature has favoured and,
second, how everybody but the scholar under consideration has voted. The response
procedure set for a given element of the state space is constructed as follows. Let c
be an element of vi’s relativised state space. Let Wi be a function from vi’s relativised
state space to the power-set of answers. Wi(c) outputs the set of all answers that could
win in c, depending on how vi themselves announces. The output Wi(c) is the response
procedure set for c.
With the response procedure defined I can divide the relativised state space for a
scholar into four types:
α: An element of vi’s relativised state space is an α element if and only if there is
more than one element of its response procedure set.
β: An element of vi’s relativised state space is a β element if and only if its response
procedure set is a singleton.
γ: An element of vi’s relativised state space is a γ element if and only if the answer
initially chosen by Nature in that element of the state space is in their response procedure
set.
δ: An element of vi’s relativised state space is an δ element if and only if the answer
initially chosen by Nature in that element of the state space is not in their response
procedure set.
Note that α/β and γ/δ are partitions of the state space. Finally, note that the following
is true of response procedure sets:
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Lemma 1 (Lemma 1). If a1 is in S’s response procedure set for scholar v1 then if v1
votes for a1 in S a1 shall be victorious in the election over S.
Suppose S is a β type set. Then no matter what v1 votes for a1 shall emerge
victorious. Hence if v1 votes for a1 it shall be. Suppose S is an α type set. Since a1
is in S’s response procedure set there must be some vote v1 could offer such that a1
would win. Consider any such vote that isn’t a1, and call S filled in with that vote
S∗. Compare S∗ to S?, which is S filled in with v1’s vote for a1. Note that in S∗ a1 is
victorious, and S? is identical S∗ with except that a1 has one more vote. Hence if a1 is
victorious in S∗ then it must also be in S?, and hence the lemma is proven.
I assume scholars are expected utility maximisers; scholars select an announcement to
make which, given their beliefs about how likely they are to be in different elements of
their relativised state space and their utility type, they expect to generate the highest
return. I say that a scholar is incentivised to fraud if it would not be expected utility
maximising to announce the evidence proposition that Nature sent them.
As mentioned in §2, I begin with a short demonstration that my representation of
the mixed credit/truth seeker is superior to what might seem like a natural alternative.
According to the alternative method of tempering the credit motive by way of truth, the
scholar has a nuanced non-binary preference structure: receiving credit > no credit but
truth victorious > other outcomes. That is to say, this scholar receives payout of 1 if
the answer they vote for is victorious, 1 > r > 0 if an answer they did not vote for but
which Nature selects in this element of the state space is victorious, and 0 otherwise.
Call this agent the nuanced credit seeker.
Lemma 2. A nuanced credit seeker would vote for answer a if and only if a pure credit
seeker in the same position would vote for a
Two scholars are in the same position if they have the same relativised state space,
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the same credence over that state space, and received the same signal from Nature.
Suppose nuanced credit seeker vn was in the same position as pure credit seeker vp.
Consider the expected utility of vp announcing ai. It is equal to
∑
ck for all elements
k of vp’s relativised state space wherein ck is a positive number and voting ai attains
payout of 1 in that element of the state space. Call the announcement that would
maximise vp’s expected utility aW . Consider the expected utility of vn announcing ai.
It is equal to ∑ ck +∑ rcj . This is the sum of all elements k of vn’s relativised state
space wherein ck is a positive number and voting ai attains payout of 1 in that element
of the state space, added to the sum of all elements j of vn’s relativised state space
wherein cj is a positive number and vn voting ai results in the community has voted
for whatever the nuanced agents middle option is. Suppose aW did not maximise vn’s
expected utility, but some other answer aF did. Note that since vp and vn face the same







rcWj . Consider when rcF will be earned. These are cases
where the nuanced agents middle option but not top option is attained. That is to say,
the community has selected the answer Nature selected, but vn has not voted for it. If in
such a case the community does not vote for aW then rcWj = rcFj would also have been
earned by vn in this scenario, since what Nature selects does not depend on what vn
voted for. Hence such cases cannot contribute to the left hand term being greater than
the right in this inequality. However, if the community does vote for aW then such cases
contribute to ∑ cWk and since vp and vn have the same credences over states this case
actually contributes more to the right hand side than the left hand side of the inequality.
Hence whether or not the community votes for aW the inequality cannot be satisfied.
Hence aW must also be vn’s expected utility maximising option.
Theorem 1 (Pessimistic Theorem). First, mixed credit/truth seekers can be incentivised
to lie in scenarios where the pure credit seeker is not. Second, if a pure credit seeker
is incentivised to lie in a scenario where a mixed credit/truth seeker is not, then in this
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scenario the scholar does not believe their vote will affect what proposition the scientific
community comes to accept.
Suppose without loss of generality that vi received signal a1. I consider the possible
states vi could believe themselves to be in, and how their behaviour would differ de-
pending on whether they were a pure credit seeker or a mixed credit and truth seeking
type.
α, γ elements of the state space. These are element where the scholar, vi is decisive and
their vote can bring about victory for the option they believe Nature to have favoured in
this element of their relativised state space. Note that if a1 is also the signal vi believes
Nature to favour in this state space, then vi cannot be incentivised to dishonesty in
this state space. If, however, a1 is not the signal they believe Nature to favour, then
the incentives of pure credit seekers and mixed credit/truth seekers can diverge. In
particular, the following is true: if the signal vi received is in the response procedure
set for an α − γ element of the state space where the signal favoured by Nature is not
identical with the signal vi received, a credit seeker cannot be incentivised to dishonesty
while a mixed credit/truth seeker can. By lemma 1 a credit seeker could vote for the
answer Nature signaled to them, and would expect to receive payout of 1 in such a
scenario. Whereas, again by lemma 1, the mixed credit/truth seeker will only receive
payout 1 if they vote for the option Nature favoured, which by hypothesis is not the
answer Nature signaled to them. Hence in α − γ elements of the state space a pure
credit seeker can never be incentivised to fraud while a mixed credit/truth seeker can.
β, γ elements of the state space. In such elements both pure credit seekers and mixed
credit/truth seekers are incentivised to fraud just under the same conditions, namely
just in case a1 is not the sole element of the response procedure set.
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δ elements of the state space. Note that in these elements a mixed credit/truth seeking
scholar is in a state of despair: no matter what they vote for they believe they will get
payout of 0. Hence they cannot be incentivised to fraud in any δ type state space.
Whereas a pure credit seeker can be, depending on whether the signal Nature sent them
is in their response procedure set.
To summarise: the mixed credit/truth seeker will not be incentivised to commit fraud,
whereas the pure credit seeker might be, in scenarios where they believe they cannot
bring the scientific community to accept the answer they believe to be true. However, in
situations where, first, they believe the community is going to accept the truth however
they vote, and, second, they do not think the evidence they received from Nature is
representative of what is true, the pure credit seeker and mixed credit/truth seeker will
be incentivised to lie at just the same times. What is more, if the two diverge and
the scholar thinks they can bring the community to accept the truth or the answer
their evidence supports depending on what they announce when they publish, then the
mixed/credit truth seeker can actually be incentivised to dishonesty where the pure
credit seeker would not be.
Now consider the behaviour of pure truth seekers.
Theorem 2 (Du Bois’ Conjecture). A pure truth seeker is incentivised to lie on strictly
fewer occasions than the mixed credit/truth seeker.
Note that all of the above argument in theorem (1) would be identical for the
pure credit seeker, with one exception. In β, γ elements of the state space the pure
credit seeker takes themselves to be a guaranteed a payout of (1) no matter how they
vote. Hence in such scenarios they cannot be incentivised to fraud, where the mixed
credit/truth seeker would be. As such, the class of scenarios which, if believed to be
most likely, would incentivise a pure truth seeker to dishonesty is a strictly proper subset
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of the class of scenarios which, if believed to be most likely, would incentivise a mixed
credit/truth seeker to dishonesty.
The first behavioural posit mentioned in §2 is now explored.
Axiom 1 (Cost of Fraud). Suppose scholar vi’s received signal sh from Nature. Then
for every element of the state space the utility of making any announcement ak 6=h is
small 1 > 0 less than it would otherwise be in that element of the state space given vi’s
utility type.
This behavioural posit can be seen as representing the idea that there is 1 cost
to fraud. This could be brought about if scholars attributed some small probability
that they will be caught and punished for fraud. Note that this generates the following
behavioural changes:
Theorem 3 (Active Honesty). If scholars obey Cost of Fraud, then the class of α, γ
elements of the state space, where the signal the scholar received is in the response set,
wherein a pure credit seeking scholar is incentivised to be honest is a super set of the
class of α elements of the state space where a truth seeking scholar is incentivised to be
honest.
Say a scholar is incentivised to be honest wherein announcing the signal they received
from Nature is their unique expected utility maximising option in a configuration. Con-
sider an α, γ element of agent vi’s state space where the signal vi received from Nature
is in their response set. If it is, then a pure credit seeking vi who obeys Cost of Fraud
will, by Lemma 1, always be incentivised to honesty. This is because whatever vi votes
for will win, so they are guaranteed to be on the winning side, and Cost of Fraud gives
vi a preference for being on the winning side with their honest announcement. However,
a pure or mixed truth seeking vi may still fail to be incentivised to honesty. In partic-
ular, suppose in the α, γ element in question the signal they received from Nature is a1
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but they believe Nature to have favoured a separate answer, a2, where a2 is itself an
element of the response procedure set. In this scenario the pure credit seeker would be
strictly incentivised to honesty while the mixed or pure truth seeker would be strictly
incentivised to dishonesty!
The second behavioural posit mentioned §2 is now explored. Consider the following
behavioural posit.
Axiom 2 (Self Confidence). Suppose scholar vj received evidence proposition ak from
Nature. Let ck be an arbitrary element of the state space wherein Nature favoured ak
and c¬k be an arbitrary element of the state space wherein Nature favoured some answer
other than ak. Scholar vj assigns small 2 ≥ 0 credence to any such c¬k.
Informally - scholars believe the results of their own research, and in particular if
their research suggests Nature favours ak then no matter what results they think their
colleagues are going to report they still believe Nature favours ak, assigning any other
alternative such a small probability as to be swamped out in expected utility calculations.
Theorem 4 (No Insecurity). If scholars satisfy self-confidence and are pure or mixed
credit/truth seekers then they would never be incentivised to commit fraud.
As before, truth seeking scholars could never be incentivised to commit fraud in a
δ type case, whereas a pure credit seeker still could. By definition and granting Self
Confidence if the agent was in a γ type case they would believe the signal they received
from Nature was in the response set. Hence whether they believed an α or β type element
of their relativised state space was most likely, the truth-motivated scholar would not
have incentive to lie if they were Self Confident.
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